Study finds Russian information attacks target Lithuanian energy and Kaliningrad transit

Russian information attacks targeting Lithuania focus on its energy sector, Kaliningrad transit and undersea cables, according to a Repsense study reported by LRT. The narratives aim to undermine public confidence in the state’s ability to protect strategic infrastructure.

The researchers analysed more than 358,000 articles, social media posts and comments in Lithuanian, Russian and English. The study covered 12 infrastructure facilities and four incidents or crises from 2025 to 2026.

Russian sources accounted for 54 percent of the hostile content identified about Lithuania’s energy sector. One recurring claim was that disconnecting from the Russia-controlled BRELL electricity system was economically damaging. Russian-language posts made up two-thirds of the material analysed about Kaliningrad transit and more than half of the content about undersea cables.

The study also examined discussion of a planned military training ground in Kapčiamiestis, in Lazdijai district. Nearly 18,000 posts about the project appeared over seven weeks, about 90 percent of them on social media. Russia-linked Telegram channels began posting about it on December 15, 2025, the day a decision was made to establish the training ground. Two days later, Russia-linked accounts claimed it was unnecessary, served NATO interests and threatened Kaliningrad. A broader public discussion in Lithuania began on December 23, after a meeting between local residents and Defence Ministry representatives.

“Russian channels launched these themes about the training ground a week before Lithuania began discussing it. Once the discussion started, the same themes appeared in Lithuanian comments almost word for word,” Repsense head Mykolas Katkus said. He described the pattern as characteristic of pre-planned information operations rather than spontaneous opposition.

Six in ten posts about Lithuanian infrastructure focused not on the facilities themselves but on the state’s ability to manage and protect them. However, most of the hostile narratives did not reach a wider audience: 12 of the 16 identified in the study did not spread beyond their initial information spaces, and none was repeated as fact by national media.

The researchers said the speed of institutional responses could affect how far such narratives spread. In the case of balloons, authorities identified who was responsible the next day, and hostile content was limited. In Kapčiamiestis, residents waited 16 days for answers, Katkus said, and others filled the silence.

The study covered September 1, 2025, to August 31, 2026, and was prepared for the Lrytas conference Security Code 2026.