US think tank outlines possible Russian attack scenario in Narva

The Institute for the Study of War, a US think tank, has described one possible scenario for a Russian attack on Estonia and an attempt to test NATO’s readiness to repel aggression, ERR reported on Monday.

The institute stressed that the scenario is hypothetical, not a forecast or an assessment of the current security situation. It does not mean such an attack is expected to take place in the near future.

The analysis by Frederick W. Kagan, Mason Clark and George Barros examines what such an operation could look like, what objectives the Kremlin might pursue and what problems it could create for Estonia and NATO.

The authors consider a full-scale Russian invasion of a NATO member state unlikely under current circumstances because Moscow remains involved in the war in Ukraine. However, they say a full-scale invasion would not be Russia’s only possible form of military escalation. A limited operation could be attractive because it would allow Russia to test NATO’s unity using a smaller force and extensive drone deployments.

The analysis was prompted in part by CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow in August and the subsequent discussion about possible Russian action against NATO. The authors note that Estonia and Latvia have repeatedly said they have not seen a concentration of Russian forces near their borders that would indicate preparations for a full-scale invasion. According to the analysis, those assessments are consistent with the situation currently visible.

At the same time, the authors consider Russia’s imposition of movement restrictions on the other side of the Narva River from September 16 to 26 significant. They say this could be a sign of possible preparations, although the measure could also be linked to Estonia’s decision to close its border with Russia if Vladimir Putin announces mobilisation in Russia.

Russia’s possible objectives

The scenario is not centred on conquering Estonia. Russia’s objective could be to create a de facto state of war with NATO, which could then be used to mobilise Russian society and justify a new wave of military recruitment.

More importantly, Moscow could seek to damage confidence in NATO’s Article 5 by committing real aggression on NATO territory and then testing whether the alliance could or would respond collectively.

Russia could also try to create a political crisis within NATO, deepen divisions between the United States and Europe, and isolate the Baltic states. One aim would be to force NATO to divert some of its resources from Ukraine to its own defence.

The Kremlin could further seek to influence public opinion and elections in Europe by portraying NATO and Brussels as the cause of the conflict with Russia, thereby strengthening eurosceptic and anti-NATO political forces favourable to Moscow.

Finally, Russia could use a crisis in Narva as a negotiating tool over Ukraine, offering to withdraw from Narva in exchange for concessions concerning Ukraine.

Russia would nevertheless seek to plan the operation in a way that did not require the use of large ground-force units or significantly undermine its military operations in Ukraine. Moscow would want to avoid a situation in which NATO viewed its actions as a full-scale invasion and responded with a major expansion of military force against Russia.